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THE EROSION OF GOVERNMENTAL DISCRETIONARY
IMMUNITY UNDER THE MISSISSIPPI TORT
CLAIMS ACT: LITTLE'S BIG EFFECT
R. Lane Dossett*
ABSTRACT
The historically broad blanket of governmental discretionary immu-
nity is tearing apart at the seams. Recent Mississippi Supreme Court deci-
sions, with a divided court, have rewritten and narrowed the application of
discretionary immunity afforded governmental entities under the Missis-
sippi Tort Claims Act, codified at Mississippi Code § 11-46-9(1)(d). For
years, the court confirmed the wide application of discretionary immunity
and the test to be employed to determine its application in defense of a
lawsuit. As recently as 2012, the Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport
Authority decision confirmed the extensive shield of discretionary immu-
nity.1 In 2013, however, the case of Little v. Mississippi Department of
Transportation2 punched a hole in the barrier of sovereign immunity, and
with subsequent decisions, the entire defense of discretionary immunity is
in serious jeopardy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort suits against governmental entities proceed under the Mississippi
Tort Claims Act.3 The discretionary function immunity applies when a
claim against a governmental entity is "based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of the governmental entity or employee thereof, whether
or not the discretion be abused."4 According to long standing jurispru-
dence, a governmental action was found to be discretionary if it satisfied
the Public Policy Function Test ("PPFT").5 Under the PPFT, discretionary
acts first involve an element of choice or judgment.6 That choice involves a
social, economic, or political policy.7
A governmental act is either discretionary or ministerial. When a stat-
ute requires the government or its employees to act, all actions taken in
furtherance of that ministerial duty are mandated as well, and no immunity
* Senior Associate at Hicks Law Firm, PLLC in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Practice areas
include governmental, personal injury, and construction defense.
1. Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'l Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68 (Miss. 2012).
2. Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So. 3d 132 (Miss. 2013).
3. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-I et seq. (West 2015).
4. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(d).
5. Jones v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 744 So. 2d 256, 260 (Miss. 1999).
6. Id.
7. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789, 800 (Miss. 2012).
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attaches.8 Historically, if the legislature mandated the government to per-
form a function, but specifically set forth that some aspect of that function
was discretionary, acts fulfilling the discretionary portion were covered by
immunity.' Prior to Little, ministerial functions were ones that were "posi-
tively imposed by law and required to be performed at a specific time and
place, removing an officer's or entity's choice or judgment."1 ° Under this
analysis, practitioners were able to easily determine if a claim was covered
with immunity by examining if the governmental entity allegedly violated a
statutory mandate.
II. HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In 1982, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that "absolute sov-
ereign immunity was out of date in modern society and modern legal con-
cepts."11  Several years later, the Mississippi Legislature enacted the
Mississippi Tort Claims Act, which provided for a limited waiver of sover-
eign immunity.12 The Act became effective in 1993.11
As reported cases accumulated, discretionary function immunity was
found to provide little or no protection to governmental entities. In fact,
the Mississippi Supreme Court read § 11-46-9(1)(b)14 to impute a standard
of ordinary care for discretion of governmental entities and their employ-
ees throughout all of the immunity subsections, including discretionary im-
munity in subsection (d), irrespective of the immunity provided for
discretionary decisions involving choice and judgment.5 This was prob-
lematic for the defense bar because "[t]he issue of ordinary care is a fact
question."'6 This interpretation, which appears to have arisen in 1999, was
overruled in 2004,17 marking the beginning of discretionary immunity being
favored.
III. PRE-LIrYLE APPLICATION OF DISCRETIONARY IMMUNITY
Previously, determining whether discretionary immunity applied was
straightforward. Discretionary immunity applied in the absence of a stat-
ute or other regulation that imposed a "specific time and place" require-
ment on how a governmental agency was required to act. If there was no
specific statute or regulation, acts were deemed discretionary, and immu-
nity applied because the "who, what, when, where, and how" decisions
8. Id. at 798.
9. Id.
10. Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Reg'I Airport Auth., 97 So. 3d 68, 72 (Miss. 2012).
11. City of Tupelo v. Martin, 747 So. 2d 822, 830 (Miss. 1999) (citing Pruett v. City of
Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1047 (Miss. 1982)).
12. Miss. CODI ANN. §§ 11-46-1 to -23.
13. Miss. CODE- ANN. § 11-46-5.
14. All statutes referenced or stated herein refer to the Mississippi Code.
15. Fairley v. George Cnty., 871 So. 2d 713, 727 (Miss. 2004) ("[l]mmunity for discretionary du-
ties is granted only when ordinary care is used.").
16. Brewer v. Burdette, 768 So. 2d 920, 923 (Miss. 2000).
17. Collins v. Tallahatchie Cnty., 876 So. 2d 284, 289 (Miss. 2004).
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were left to the discretion of government employees. This analysis is seen
in a number of high profile decisions on discretionary immunity.
In Fortenberry v. City of Jackson,"8 a homeowner sued the City of
Jackson because their home overflowed with raw sewage due to a backup.
The court found that § 21-27-189(b) allowed Jackson to operate and main-
tain its sewage system with discretion that invoked immunity because the
statute that provided municipalities with the authority to operate sewer sys-
tems expressly empowered them to act according to their "discretion."1 9 In
City of Natchez v. De La Barre, the plaintiff was injured from falling on a
city sidewalk.2z Unlike Fortenberry, the statute at issue in De La Barre,
§ 21-37-3, did not expressly use the word "discretion."'2 ' Discretionary im-
munity applied, however, because the statute that empowered the City with
control over sidewalks did not impose a duty to maintain them. Con-
versely, discretionary immunity did not apply in Nosef ex. rel. Cowart,
where the decedent's vehicle flipped over a culvert.2 2 Section 65-21-1 im-
posed a ministerial duty to place warning posts at culverts, which was not
performed.3
IV. LITTLE v. Mississippi DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
"Today, we provide a much needed correction."
24
In Little, three motorists struck a pine tree that had fallen across a
highway.25 Section 65-21-1 states that it "shall be the duty" of the Highway
Department to "main[tain], repair and inspect all of the state-maintained
state highway system.",2 6 Numerous decisions have declared the duty to
maintain highways under the statute discretionary because the statute does
not provide any specifics concerning how the duty is to be performed.27
Initially, the Mississippi Court of Appeals found, consistent with prior
cases, that maintenance of highways was discretionary. The court stated in
Farris v. Mississippi Transportation Commission that because "[s]ection 65-
1-65 does not 'impose any specific directives as to the time, manner, and
conditions for carrying out . . . MDOT's duty to maintain highways,"'
18. Fortenberry v. City of Jackson, 71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011).
19. Id. at 1200.
20. City of Natchez v. De La Barre, 145 So. 3d 729, 730 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
21. Id. at 732; see Miss. CoDiE ANN. § 21-37-3 (West 2015).
22. Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Nosef ex. rel. Cowart, 110 So. 3d 317, 318 (Miss. 2013).
23. Id. at 319.
24. Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So. 3d 132, 138 (Miss. 2013).
25. Id. at 134.
26. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 65-21-1 (West 2015).
27. See Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So. 2d 258, 269 (Miss. 2003), overruled by Miss.
Transp. Comm'n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789 (Miss. 2012); Brewer v. Burdette, 768 So. 2d 920, 923
(Miss. 2000), overruled by Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. Montgomery, 80 So. 3d 789 (Miss. 2012); Mohundro
v. Alcorn Cnty., 675 So. 2d 848, 854 (Miss. 1996); Coplin v. Francis, 631 So. 2d 752, 754-55 (Miss.
1994); State ex rel. Brazeale v. Lewis, 498 So. 2d 321, 323 (Miss. 1986); see also McFarland v. Miss. Dep't
of Transp., 81 So. 3d 1209, 1212 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Farris v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 63 So. 3d 1241,
1244 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Lee v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 37 So. 3d 73, 81 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Knight
v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 10 So. 3d 962, 970 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
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MDOT was required to "use its judgment and discretion in carrying out
that duty. 
' 28
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals. The court opened its analysis by emphasizing
that "[tihe language of Section 11-46-9(1)(d) requires us to look at the
function performed-not the acts that are committed in furtherance of that
function-to determine whether immunity exists."' 29 The particular "func-
tion" at issue was right-of-way maintenance, not the specific decision con-
cerning whether or not to cut down a tree.30 The court noted that,
previously, "while a certain act may be mandated by statute, how that act is
performed can be a matter of discretion."'" The court found that such law
no longer applied because "[i]t is the function of a governmental entity-
not the acts performed in order to achieve that function-to which immu-
nity does or does not ascribe under the MTCA., 32 The court, therefore,
suggested that jurists should take a wider view of the statutes into the pres-
ence or absence of controlling guidelines.
The Little court heavily emphasized the importance of examining the
"function" of the governmental entity and not the acts involved, pursuant
to the express language of § 11-46-9(1)(d). In emphasizing the importance
of the "function" inquiry, the court ignored, without explanation, the im-
munity that is equally provided to any "duty." In context, § 11-46-9(1)(d)
provides immunity for the "performance or the failure to exercise or per-
form a discretionary function or duty on the part of the governmental en-
tity . . . . ,33 Although Mississippi courts have stated that immunity does
not apply to "acts," they have not explained how an "act" differs from a
"duty" or "function."
V. THE BIG IMPACT OF LITTLE
At the time of the writing of this Article, there were at least twenty
reported decisions citing or relying on Little. Many of these decisions have
extended Little's reach into areas that have been traditionally shielded with
immunity.
Relying upon Little, the Mississippi Court of Appeals in Serrano v.
Laurel Housing Authority34 held that discretionary immunity did not apply
to an injury caused by a falling light fixture because the legislature created
housing authorities to "provid[e] . . . safe and sanitary dwelling accommo-
dations for persons of low income," pursuant to § 43-33-3.35 The broad,
sweeping holding of the Serrano opinion, that "Laurel Housing's duty to
28. Farris v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 63 So. 3d 1241, 1244 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), overruled by
Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So. 3d 132 (Miss. 2013).
29. Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So. 3d 132, 136 (Miss. 2013).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 137.
32. Id. at 138.
33. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(d) (emphasis added).
34. Serrano v. Laurel Hous. Auth., 151 So. 3d 256 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
35. Id. at 261 (alteration in original).
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provide safe apartments for its low-income residents is clearly mandated by
the Legislature," effectively makes it an absolute insurer of safety without
any mandatory directive to act in any certain way.36 The court held that
"[b]uilt into the Legislative definition of a 'housing project' is that it is a
'work or undertaking ... to provide decent, safe and sanitary urban or rural
dwellings, apartments, or other living accommodations for persons of low
income[.]"' 37 The court stated it was attempting to follow "Little's logic,
[that] "all acts in furtherance of that [mandated] duty . . . are ministerial
unless ... another statute makes a particular act discretionary."38 Unlike
Little, where the statute stated that the Highway Department "shall...
maintain [and] repair" highways, the statutes in Serrano merely provided
aspirations for safety that were void of any mandatory directive to act, such
as a directive to provide maintenance.
39
The Mississippi Supreme Court indicated its clear desire to remodel
discretionary immunity with several other recent decisions, including a cli-
mactic point that occurred on December 4, 2014, when the court acknowl-
edged the sweeping changes in Brantley v. City of Horn Lake4° and
Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville."
In Brantley, the plaintiff was injured while being transported on a
stretcher that was dropped.42 The municipal defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment under § 11-46-9(1)(c), which protects governmental em-
ployees engaged in the performance or exercise of duties or activities in
relation to police or fire protection, and the trial court granted summary
judgment on that ground.43 The Mississippi Supreme Court requested sup-
plemental briefing on the applicability of discretionary function exemp-
tion.44 The court found that defendants were not engaged in fire
protection.45 The court then discussed discretionary immunity, and abol-
ished the two-part PPFT, which had been used over a decade.46 Consistent
with prior statutory analysis, the court noted § 41-55-1 provides that a mu-
nicipality "may, in its discretion, own, maintain, and operate an ambulance
service.' 47 But the court then stated that "once a municipality has decided
to operate and maintain [an] ambulance service, it is subject to several min-
isterial statutes and regulations which remove the municipality's discretion
from many functions and duties and render such functions and duties min-




39. Id. at 259-61.
40. Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, 152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014).
41. Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville, 152 So. 3d 265 (Miss. 2014).
42. Brantley, 152 So. 3d at 1108.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1111.
46. Id. at 1112.
47. Id. at 1116.
48. Id.
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regulations or training policies on" how to fulfill the duty of unloading a
patient from an ambulance safely.
49
In Booneville, the plaintiff unknowingly purchased land that had been
sold for delinquent municipal taxes.5 0 The Booneville plaintiff redeemed
the land and sued Prentiss County, the City of Booneville, and the City Tax
Collector for damages incurred from their failure to provide notice of a tax
sale.1 Consistent with Brantley, the Booneville court addressed the issue
of discretionary function immunity even though the issue was not raised by
any of the parties.52 The court found § 27-41-79 imposed a ministerial duty
upon the tax collector to file the tax sale list with the chancery clerk, and
that such acts were not shielded with immunity because they are not left to
the choice or judgment of the official.53
Most recently, in Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, the Mississippi Su-
preme Court disturbed the firmly grounded immunity for municipal opera-
tion of a sewer system54 provided by Fortenberry. The court affirmed that
sewer maintenance is presumptively discretionary by statute, pursuant to
§ 21-27-163.5' The court, however, stated that the statute was not the end
of the inquiry, but that the court must also consider, "pursuant to our hold-
ing in Brantley[,] . . . whether there are narrower functions or duties con-
comitant to the general discretionary function of sewage maintenance that
have been rendered ministerial through statute, ordinance, or regula-
tions. ' 56 The court then noted that "sewage systems must comply with the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, a statute which makes it unlawful to
dump raw sewage into the environment.,57 The court stated that, while
"[m]unicipal sewage maintenance generally is a discretionary function ...
several narrower functions and duties associated with sewage maintenance
are mandated by statute or regulation and thus are ministerial and re-
moved from discretionary function immunity."58 The case was remanded
to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to "prove that the City's alleged inac-
tion in repairing the sewage system was related to a more narrow function
made ministerial by statute, ordinance, regulation, or other binding
directive.
59
The Little decision contains a self-pronounced change in the law,60 and
subsequent decisions have shown how far that change extends. A sample
49. Id. at 1117.
50. Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville, 152 So. 3d 265, 267 (Miss. 2014).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Id.
54. Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville, No. 2012-CA-01458-SCT, 2015 WL 574802, at *1 (Miss. Feb.
12, 2015) (mandate has not been issued at the time of publication).
55. Id. at *7.
56. Id. at *5.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *7.
59. Id.
60. Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So. 3d 132, 137 (Miss. 2013).
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of the changes in areas that were traditionally shielded with immunity in-
clude Little's requirement for the Department of Transportation to "main-
tain and repair state highways,"61 Calonkey v. Amory School District's
obligation to maintain schools,62 Serrano's "duty to provide safe apart-
ments[,]' '63 and Boroujerdi's suggestion of ministerial duties in the opera-
tion of municipal sewer systems.64
VI. CONCLUSION
Discretionary function immunity is in a period of significant transition.
This judicially imposed shift is occurring despite the courts' previous state-
ments that "the judiciary [is] not the appropriate branch of government to
regulate sovereign immunity."6 The best avenue for addressing these
closely divided court decisions may be a legislative change, as the appellate
courts' new direction appears firmly set. Perhaps changes in the court ros-
ter will restore the old established test for discretionary immunity, which is
similar to the Federal test. Until then, governmental defense practitioners
should be diligent in studying this ever-changing area and strive to compel
plaintiff-practitioners to identify a specific statute or other law which
moves the governmental function into a ministerial realm. While prevail-
ing on the discretionary immunity defense will be more problematic, the
defense should fight to protect the legislative intent to establish broad dis-
cretionary immunity to governmental entities under § 11-46-11(1)(d).
61. Id. at 138.
62. Calonkey v. Amory Sch. Dist., No. 2013-CA-01290-COA, 2014 WL 4548866 (Miss. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2014).
63. Serrano v. Laurel Hous. Auth., 151 So. 3d 256, 261 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014).
64. Boroujerdi, 2015 WL 574802, at *5.
65. Wells by Wells v. Panola Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 645 So. 2d 883, 889 (Miss. 1994) (citing Pruett v.
City of Rosedale, 421 So. 2d 1046, 1051 (Miss. 1982)).
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